Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (Ohio 1937)
Rulemaking authority of administrative bodies. This case is specifically about the power of a Public Utilities Commission to make rules regarding the use of safety equipment on business trucks.
As a general rule a law which confers discretion on an executive officer or board without establishing any standards for guidance is a delegation of legislative power and unconstitutional; but when the discretion to be exercised relates to a police regulation for the protection of the public morals, health, safety or general welfare, and it is impossible or impracticable to provide such standards, and to do so would defeat the legislative object sought to be accomplished, legislation conferring such discretion may be valid and constitutional without such restrictions and limitations. (Emphasis added.) [Go to Quote]
City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 40 N.E.2d 412 (Ohio 06/02/1943)
This is the seminal case that defines the limits of the police power in Ohio.
. . . when an act of such body is challenged we must determine whether the act conforms to rules of fundamental law designed to curb and check the unwarranted exercise of unreasonable and arbitrary power. (Emphasis added.) [Go to Quote]
State v. Switzer, 22 Ohio St.2d 47, 257 N.E.2d 908 (Ohio 04/15/1970)
Department of Wildlife rule regarding length of fish was valid delegation of legislative authority.
State v. Schreckengost, 30 Ohio St.2d 30, 282 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio 04/26/1972)
Division of Parks and Recreation rule regarding where to swim was valid delegation of legislative authority.
Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Jump, 61 Ohio St.2d 246, 400 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 02/20/1980)
When the General Assembly delegates power to an administrative official, it must provide standards insofar as it is possible to do so. [Go to Quote]
Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Ratchford, 64 Ohio St.2d 256, 416 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 12/30.1980)
Rulemaking authority. This is an often-quoted decision. The case is specifically about rules imposed on health insurance providers. The statute in question had many detailed guidelines.
A statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power if it establishes, through legislative policy and such standards as are practical, an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform and further establishes a procedure whereby exercise of the discretion can be reviewed effectively. (Syllabus) [Go to Quote]
Our past requirement of standards, although perhaps too rigidly stated, has protected private rights both in the clarity with which it defined the boundaries of discretion and in the notice which it has given private parties of what is required of them. As a consequence, standards, where practical, should be established by the General Assembly. [Go to Quote]
Carroll v. Department of Administrative Services, 10 Ohio App.3d 108, 460 N.E.2d 704 (Ct. of App., Franklin Cty. 06/09/1983)
Rule about sick leave overturned as it exceeded the authority of the administrator.
The purpose of administrative rulemaking is to facilitate the administrative agency's placing into effect the policy declared by the General Assembly in the statutes to be administered by the agency. In other words, administrative agency rules are an administrative means for the accomplishment of a legislative end. By contrast, because it bears no reasonable relationship to the legislative purpose stated in the statute, the rule declares policy rather than dealing with administrative detail. [Go to Quote]
. . . because the power delegated is to administer rather than to legislate, the director may not promulgate rules which add to his delegated powers, no matter how laudable or sensible the ends sought to be accomplished. [Go to Quote]
Schwarz v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 31 Ohio St.3d 267, 510 N.E.2d 808 (Ohio 07/22.1987)
Case involving suing using 42 U.S.C. 1983 in state courts. The court of common pleas can have jurisdiction.
The courts of common pleas possess jurisdiction to entertain federal claims seeking prospective injunctive relief brought under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, against individual state officers in their official capacities, in order to redress deprivations of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed by the United States Constitution. (Syllabus) [Go to Quote]
. . . in order to establish a right to relief under Section 1983, ' * * * a plaintiff must plead and prove at least two elements: (1) that he has been deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States; and (2) that the defendant deprived him of this right while acting under color of law.' [Go to Quote]
It has been stated that the courts of common pleas possess jurisdiction to entertain such claims because such courts are ones of original and general jurisdiction, and because Congress has permitted such actions to be brought in state courts as well as federal courts, thereby providing state courts concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims. [Go to Quote]
(27) For the purposes of this Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Crane, Broekema, Haenicke, Jennings, and Trustees, when performing the actions as averred in paragraphs (1) through (20) of this Complaint, were acting under color of state law. (Plaintiff's Complaint) [Go to Quote]
State v. Batsch, 44 Ohio App.3d 81, 541 N.E.2d 475 (Ct. of App., Portage Cty. 03/07/1988)
Seat belt law is reasonable extension of the police power (but court gave very little reasoning).
State ex rel. Brown v. Summit County Board of Elections, 46 Ohio St.3d 166, 545 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 10/25/1989)
An election case that strict scrutiny should be used for fundamental right.
In considering this equal-protection challenge . . ., we must determine whether the classification created by the requirement affects a fundamental constitutional right. If a fundamental constitutional right is affected, the burden will be on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. [Go to Quote]
DDDJ, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Commission, 46 Ohio St.3d 166, 545 N.E.2d 1256 (Ct. of App., Franklin Cty. 08/30/1990)
A happy-hour rule for bars upheld.
. . . an administrative agency may only promulgate regulations that are consistent with and predicated on an expressed or implied statutory grant of authority. [Go to Quote]
City of Cincinnati ex rel. Kuntz v. City of Cincinnati, 79 Ohio App.3d 86, 606 N.E.2d 1028 (Ct. of App., Hamilton Cty. 04/01/1992)
Attorney's fees are recoverable under 42 USC 1988 even under state law claims, if it shares a common nucleus of operative fact with the separate federal claim.
Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 595 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio 08/12/1992)
False-arrest case (faulty identification involving suing using 42 U.S.C. 1983 in state courts). The court of common pleas has jurisdiction.
. . . federal courts in Ohio have concluded that R.C. 9.86 and 2743.02(F) do not apply to Section 1983 claims even when such claims are pursued in state court. [Go to Quote]
Knutty v. Wallace, 84 Ohio App.3d 623, 617 N.E.2d 783 (Ct. of App., Franklin Cty. 12/31/1992)
Enforcement of administrative rule conflicted with state law and violated constitutional rights. Gives good synopsis of rulemaking authority. Quotes from Carroll.
[t]he basic limitation on this authority is that an administrative agency may not legislate by enacting rules which are in excess of legislative policy, or which conflict with the enabling statute. (Quoting English v. Koster (1980)). [Go to Quote]
Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 06/01.1994)
Unconstitutionality of the Tort Reform Act of 1987.
According to principles of due process, however, governmental action which limits the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights is subject to the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Under the strict scrutiny standard for reviewing legislation which restricts the exercise of fundamental rights, a statute will be considered unconstitutional unless it is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. [Go to Quote]
Knutty v. Wallace, 100 Ohio App.3d 555, 654 N.E.2d 420 (Ct. of App., Franklin Cty. 01/31.1995)
The case came back up with the issue of awarding attorney's fees. This sets out the rules for that.
A prevailing party on a claim based exclusively on state law may be awarded attorney fees if the state claim was joined in an action with a claim based on a federal right created under statute specified in Section 1988, the state claim arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim, and the federal claim, although unaddressed, otherwise met the substantiality test of Hagans v. Lavine and United Mine Workers of Am v. Gibbs. [Go to Quote]
Midwestern College of Massotherapy v. Ohio Medical Board, 102 Ohio App.3d 17, 656 N.E.2d 963 (Ct. of App., Franklin Cty. 03/21/1995)
Rule on scope-of-practice for massages upheld.
Generally, a law which confers discretion on a board without establishing any guidelines is a delegation of legislative power and is unconstitutional. However, an exception to this general rule applies when a law concerns the state's exercise of its police powers. A law which delegates discretion without providing guidelines may nevertheless be valid and constitutional when the law relates to the protection of the public morals, health, safety, or general welfare, and guidelines would defeat the intended legislative objective. In such a situation, the administrative body may issue rules and they will be a proper exercise of administrative power provided the rules are not unreasonable, discriminatory, or in conflict with the law. A rule which is unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, or in conflict with law is invalid and unconstitutional because it surpasses administrative powers and constitutes a legislative function. Nor may an administrative body promulgate rules which add to its delegated powers. An administrative body may only promulgate regulations consistent with and predicated upon an express or implicit statutory grant of authority. A rule that bears no reasonable relation to the legislative purposes of the authorizing statute improperly declares policy. [Go to Quote]
Redman v. Ohio Department of Indus. Rel., 75 Ohio St.3d 399, 662 N.E.2d 352 (Ohio 04/10/1996)
Discussion of the power of the General Assembly to delegate legislative and administrative power to administrative bodies or officers.
No new quotes here; it just quotes the standard ones from Matz and Ratchford.
Chambers v. St. Mary's School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563, 697 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio 08/12/1998)
The violation of an administrative rule does not constitute negligence per se; however, such a violation may be admissible as evidence of negligence. Contains discussion of the rulemaking power of administrative bodies.
The legislative process and accountability are the cornerstones of the democratic process which justify the General Assembly's role as lawmaker. In contrast, administrative rules do not dictate public policy, but rather expound upon public policy already established by the General Assembly in the Revised Code. . . . Yet determination of public policy remains with the General Assembly. Administrative agencies may make only "subordinate" rules. [Go to Quote]
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303 (Ohio.App.Dist.6 03/02/2000)
Discussion of qualified immunity.
The defendant bears the initial burden of coming forward with facts to suggest that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority during the incident in question. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's conduct violated a right so clearly established that any official in his position would have clearly understood that he was under an affirmative duty to refrain from such conduct. [Go to Quote]
State of Ohio v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 (Ohio 04/28/2000)
Constitutionality of "Megan's Law." This has a good discussion of Equal Protection and how it applies.
This rational basis analysis is discarded for a higher level of scrutiny only where the challenged statute involves a suspect class or a fundamental constitutional right. . . . Recognized fundamental rights include the right to vote, the right of interstate travel, rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right to procreate, and other rights of a uniquely personal nature. [Go to Quote]
Greene County Agricultural Society v. Liming, 89 Ohio.St.3d 55 (Ohio 09/06/2000)
County Fair is a "political subdivision" as far as the law concerns. This is probably relevant as to whether it is a governmental entity that is subject to respecting a right of personal appearance.
Scott v. City of Columbus, (Ct. of App., Franklin Cty. 03/30/2001)
42 USC 1983 tossed due to governmental immunity. Refers to many other cases regarding immunity.